But, as noted earlier, this is no zero-sum game. The financial system-the traders, the brokers, the investment bankers, the money managers, the middlemen, "Wall Street," as it were-takes a cut of all this frenzied activity, leaving investors as a group inevitably playing a loser's game. As bets are exchanged back and forth, our attempts to beat the market, and the attempts of our institutional money managers to do so, then, enrich only the croupiers, a clear analogy to our racetracks, our casinos and our state lotteries.

So, if we want to encourage and maximize the retirement savings of our citizens, we must drive the money changers-or at least most of them-out of the temples of finance. If we investors collectively own the markets, but individually compete to beat our fellow market participants, we lose. But if we abandon our inevitably futile attempts to obtain an edge over other market participants and all simply hold our share of the market portfolio, we win. (Please re-read those two sentences!) Truth told, it is as simple as that. So our Federal Retirement Board should not only foster the use of broad-market index funds in the new DC system (and offer them in its own "fallback" system described earlier) but approve only private providers who offer their index funds at minimum costs.

Balance Risk And Return Through Asset Allocation
The balancing of return and risk is the quintessential task of intelligent investing, and that task too would be the province of the Federal Retirement Board. If the wisest, most experienced minds in our investment community and our academic community believe-as they do-that the need for risk aversion increases with age; that market timing is a fool's game (and is obviously not possible for investors as a group); and that predicting stock market returns has a very high margin for error, then something akin to roughly matching the bond index fund percentage with each participant's age with the remainder committed to the stock index fund, is the strategy that is most likely to serve most plan participants with the most effectiveness. Under extenuating-and very limited-circumstances, participants could have the ability to opt out of that allocation.

This allocation pattern is clearly accepted by most fund industry marketers, in the choice of the bond/stock allocations of their increasingly popular "target retirement funds." However, too many of these fund sponsors apparently have found it a competitive necessity to hold stock positions that are significantly higher than the pure age-based equivalents described earlier. I don't believe competitive pressure should be allowed to establish the allocation standard, and would leave those decisions to broad policies set by the new Federal Retirement Board.

I also don't believe that past returns on stocks that include, from time to time, substantial phantom returns-born of swings from fear to greed to hope, back and forth-are a sound basis for establishing appropriate asset allocations for plan participants. Our market strategists, in my view, too often deceive themselves by their slavish reliance on past returns, rather than focusing on what returns may lie ahead, based on the projected discounted future cash flows that, however far from certainty, represent the intrinsic values of U.S. business in the aggregate.

Once we spread the risk of investing to investors as a group, we've accomplished the inevitably worthwhile goal: a low-cost financial system that is based on the wisdom of long-term investing, eschewing the fallacy of the short-term speculation that is so deeply entrenched in our markets today. To do so, we must first eliminate the risk of picking individual stocks, of picking market sectors, and of picking money managers, leaving only market risk, which cannot be avoided. Such a strategy effectively guarantees that all DC-plan participants will garner their fair share of whatever returns our stock and bond markets are generous enough to bestow on us (or, for that matter, mean-spirited enough to inflict on us). Compared to today's loser's game, that would be a signal accomplishment.

Under the present system, some of us will outlive our retirement savings and depend on our families. Others will go to their rewards with large savings barely yet tapped, benefiting their heirs. But like investment risk, longevity risk can be pooled. So as the years left to accumulate assets dwindle down, and as the years of living on the returns from those assets begin, we need to institutionalize, as it were, a planned program of conversion of a portion of our retirement plan assets into annuities. (It could well be integrated with a plan most of us already have, one that includes defined benefits, an inflation hedge, and virtually bulletproof credit standing. It is called "Social Security.")

This evolution will be a gradual process; it could be limited to plan participants with assets above a certain level; and it could be accomplished by the availability of annuities created by private enterprise and offered at minimum cost, again with providers overseen by the proposed Federal Retirement Board (just as the federal Thrift Savings Plan has its own board and management, and operates as a private enterprise).

Focus On Mutuality, Investment Risk And Longevity Risk
The pooling of the savings of retirement plan investors in this new pension fund environment is the only way to maximize the returns of these investors as a group. The pool would feature a widely diversified, all-market strategy, a rational (if inevitably imperfect) asset allocation, and low costs, and be delivered by a private system in which investors automatically and regularly save from their own incomes, aided where possible by matching contributions of their employers, and would prove that an annuity-like mechanism to minimize longevity risks is the optimal system to assure maximum retirement plan security for our nation's families.

There remains the task of bypassing Wall Street's croupiers, an essential part of the necessary reform. Surely our Federal Retirement Board would want to evaluate the need for the providers of DC retirement plan service to be highly cost-efficient, or even to be mutual in structure-management companies that are owned by their fund shareholders and operated on an "at-cost" basis-and annuity providers that are similarly structured. The arithmetic is there, and the sole mutual fund firm that is organized under such a mutual structure has performed with remarkable effectiveness.