Judging from the financial market’s reaction to China’s decision to devalue the yuan, the mandarins whom increasingly appear to be China’s clueless emperors could be triggering a global slowdown, perhaps to stimulate their own economy at the expense of everyone else. But given China’s lame attempts to rig or prop up their own equity market, what is the likely impact of their latest move over the long term?

China’s decision came on late Monday as many of the world’s leading economists and financial minds were leaving Camp Kotok, an annual fishing trip in far eastern Maine organized by Cumberland Advisors Chief Investment Officer David Kotok. The majority of these wise men and women seemed to agree that the Federal Reserve should drop its zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) and raise rates in September.

Early reviews of the mandarins' efforts to manipulate the yuan are as unfavorable as their blundering attempt to rig their stock market.  But China’s move threw yet another prospective monkey wrench into the Fed’s decision machinery, in the view of some market participants. It sent the Dow Jones Industrial Average falling by 500 points in less than two days, though it retraced about 50% of its losses today. Many observers are wondering if the Chinese government is discovering their economy is weaker than they previously thought and whether the U.S. is witnessing the beginning of what some expect to be a long overdue equity market pullback.

Stock market and economic cycles march to the beat of different drummers. Robert Eisenbeis, Cumberland’s vice chairman and chief monetary economist and a former executive vice president of the Atlanta Fed, isn’t buying into the fear of a strong dollar derailing the current domestic economic expansion. “The kind of horror stories people are spinning focus on [multinational] companies reporting lousy earnings,” he says.

It goes without saying that the CEOs of these multinationals are unhappy as they fail to meet their earnings targets. They see their eight-figure bonuses threatened (although Fortune 500 compensation committees can always adjust their metrics to account for unexpected events) and some may also be forced to consider retrenchment and restructuring, not the kind legacy they want to leave six years into a recovery. Observers like Larry Kudlow think these CEOs need to stop whining and build a strong dollar into their future business models.

The question Eisenbeis asks is, what percentage of GDP do companies like Exxon, GM or Coca-Cola account for? Given that the lion’s share of revenues for many multinationals comes from overseas, the answer is less than many people think.

A strong dollar translates into cheaper manufactured goods like clothing and patio furniture from China and cheaper commodity inputs for domestically produced goods. Either way, American consumers benefit from cheaper T-shirts or other goods produced here.

But America's situation is very different than that of most other nations. “If we were Australia or Venezuela where exports are a huge percentage of GDP,” it would be a different story in Eisenbeis’s view. Indeed, Camp Kotok was well represented with economists from another commodity-producing nation, many of them proudly singing "Oh Canada" while privately voicing concerns that our northern neighbor could be on the verge of a recession.

Wells Fargo chief economist John Silvia thinks that the Fed is still focused primarily on the U.S. economy and consequently will raise rates in September. But after that, they may turn their attention to examining the underlying weakness of the Chinese economy. Potentially, the U.S. central bank could become less aggressive in late 2015 and 2016 if they see start to a negative impact on U.S. exports, whcih account for one-third of U.S. corporate profits.

When it comes to spreading the pain, Silvia notes that China's reach is extensive, as its economy dominates activity in the Far East while exerting a major influence on nations like Brazil and Australia. Like Eisenbeis, he thinks the U.S. economy should be alright but he says the impact on our export competitveness remains uncertain.

More troubling is the question mentioned above—do China's leaders really know what they are doing or are they losing their grip on reality? They may have more advanced degrees from M.I.T. than Bernanke, Draghi, Summers, Krugman and the Koch brothers combined, but they've never had any work experience in free markets, a minor problem. If they spark a deflationary contagion across Asia, their own economy could be a major victim.

And they may be getting rattled for several reasons, not the least of which is that, when it comes to the global economy, America is reasserting its position as the smartest kid in summer school. During the first decade of this century, including the years immediately following the Great Recession, China was the driving force of the global economy. Suddenly, the U.S. economy, though hardly buoyant, appears to taken over that role for the time being in Silvia's view.

America may be more immune to China's problems than other nations but, at the same time, underestimating China's long-term clout would be pure hubris. John Mauldin, another Camp Kotok attendee, noted in a piece this week that Xiaomi, a Chinese tech company, is now surpassing Apple in domestic smart phone sales. Xiaomi is also viewed as a serious threat to several fast-growing U.S. semiconductor manufacturers.

Could a strong dollar and weak euro jumpstart the moribund European economy? Only at the margins. “Their problems are political,” Eisenbeis says. It’s true that cheap oil will benefit Europe, but nations like France seem more obsessed with suffocating growth businesses like Uber than in promoting growth. England, which refused to join the euro, is set to surpass France as the eurozone’s second largest economy despite having 20 million fewer people.

It’s little surprise that many European companies are trying to get out of Europe, and they are not alone. Mercedes, Toyota and Honda are producing more cars here so things have a way of evening out. Indeed, Silvia says European exports could also be at risk.

Still, the real game-changer is the price of energy, and that’s permanent in Eisenbeis’s view. It’s also unambiguously good for America, increasing real income while leaving the country far less vulnerable to dictators in places we’d prefer not to deal with. Some observers now think $30 a barrel oil is real possibility.

Lower gas prices are often compared to tax cuts, putting more money in consumers’ wallets even if they don't get a pay raise. But it's almost one year since oil prices began their descent, and Americans haven’t spent it.  Many of them still don’t believe cheap oil is permanent. The same thing happened when Congress enacted numerous temporary one-time tax cuts during the Bush administration and the Obama stimulus. The emerging global energy glut appears to be different, though convincing consumers it is permanent could be a tough sell.

Eisenbeis sees few negatives on the horizon and most are potential ones. “The weaker the rest of the world is relative to us, the greater the demand for the dollar and U.S.-centric activities,” he says.

He didn't say it, but some similarities between China's current predicament and Thailand's baht crisis in 1998 are starting to surface. Back then, the S&P 500 briefly corrected about 19% but commodities collapsed as the dollar surged and the U.S. economy sailed along in its longest expansion in modern times, despite complaints from CEOs about currency translation woes. China, of course, is a much bigger player today than Thailand was then.

What else could upset the apple cart? “The big risk is that the Fed doesn’t normalize policy and things get out of balance,” Eisenbeis warns.

Any decision carries inherent risk. America could become hedge funds’ favored domicile for carry trades, just as Japan once was. When the Fed begins to raise rates after nearly seven years of ZIRP, foreign institutions in Europe and elsewhere can borrow at home and earn higher rates in the U.S. That could create all sorts of distortions, frustrating the ability of European QE to work while draining funds as European investors flock to more attractive high-quality Treasurys.

If the U.S. became the recipient of massive capital inflows, debt could decline and there would be a major shrinkage in collateral. But that potential problem is far away on the horizon.