In short, stuff happens, and if Chinese leaders do not manage the fallout well when it does, the public could turn against them. How the regime responds in that case will tell the tale. And it could be a tale – can you say “Tiananmen Square”? – that no government wants to reprise at home.
China, clearly, is emerging as a world power, even more quickly than it otherwise would, to the extent that the US is coming to be seen as an unreliable partner concerned only with advancing its own interests – at the expense, if necessary, of other countries. But the belief that China will continue growing at mid-single-digit rates for an extended period violates the first rule of forecasting: don’t extrapolate the present into the future. At some point, China will hit bumps in the road, and there is no guarantee that its leaders will admit their failures and adjust policy accordingly.
At that point, the Chinese model of strong political control will appear less alluring to other countries, especially if the regime clamps down hard on civil society. Democracy, then, may have a future after all.
Barry Eichengreen is professor of economics at the University of California, Berkeley; Pitt Professor of American History and Institutions at the University of Cambridge; and a former senior policy advisor at the International Monetary Fund. His latest book is "Hall of Mirrors: The Great Depression, the Great Recession, and the Uses – and Misuses – of History."